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Crawford’s Impact on Hearsay
Statements in Domestic Violence and
Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Robert P. Mosteller †
I.

INTRODUCTION

I hope that the Supreme Court will ultimately define
Crawford’s 1 testimonial concept in a way that is neither formal
nor formalistic, 2 giving it a reasonably broad scope that covers
most accusatory statements in non-confidential settings. 3 If my

†
Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1970, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1975, Yale University; M.P.P. 1975, Harvard
University. I wish to thank the participants and those who organized this excellent
Symposium for their contributions to this Comment and my research assistant Justin
Diamant for his assistance.
1
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
By formal, I refer to the requirements of written or recorded medium for
the statement, which is at the heart of the definition proposed by Justices Thomas and
Scalia in White v. Illinois. 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). If the
statement defines its testimonial quality, the coverage of the Confrontation Clause is
subject to easy manipulation by the police by avoiding such formality. By formalistic, I
mean wooden adherence to a set formula rather than a functional approach based on
the protective purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The most important feature is the
core concern of whether certain witnesses were making criminal accusations against
the defendant. Beyond that, a rigid formula should not be imposed. See generally
Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the Formalistic Definition – The Case for an
“Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST. 14 (Summer 2005).
3
At the presentation of the papers for this Symposium, I made comments
regarding two topics. My first comments concerned “Testimonial Statements.” I began
by expressing trepidation that this critical term may ultimately be defined in an
unfortunately narrow, formal, and formalistic fashion. I quoted a conversation from
the Vietnam war movie Platoon. In a scene that precedes the final devastating enemy
attack, “Red” O’Neill approaches his platoon leader, Bob Barnes, who is played by Tom
Berringer. Red asks Bob to allow him to leave on one of the last departing helicopters
for R&R set to begin only a few days later. After Bob turns him down because every
available soldier is needed, Red pleads for reconsideration: “I got a bad feeling on this
one, all right?. . . I mean I got a bad feeling!” PLATOON (Orion Pictures 1986).
Red’s plea was not granted, and his bad feeling was accurate. He did not
survive the night. I hope that by contrast my fear is misguided.
My major substantive point here is that the definition would be better if it
focused on “accusatory” statements rather than “testimonial” ones and that it would be
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hope is realized, the restrictions Crawford places on evidence
will exclude much hearsay evidence that before Crawford was
received in domestic violence cases, and it will have a
somewhat lesser, but still important, impact on hearsay in
child sexual abuse cases. 4 However, as I have argued earlier, 5
widespread failures of prosecution are neither necessary nor
inevitable even if the type of interpretation of Crawford that I
advocate is adopted.
In cases involving child sexual abuse, prosecutors before
Crawford often depended on hearsay statements by children to
police, other government investigators, and to specialized
medical investigating teams.
Crawford, under my
interpretation, will exclude many of these statements because
they violate the confrontation rights of the defendant.
However, as I describe in Part II, Crawford allows admission of
such statements if the child testifies at trial and is subject to
cross-examination, thus offering a method for prosecutors to
ameliorate Crawford’s negative impact. As I describe in Part
III, in domestic violence cases, victims are often more willing to
speak with authorities immediately after the violence than
later when they are called to testify at trial. Before the
Crawford decision, prosecutors introduced hearsay statements
made by victims to police and other government agents shortly
after the violence. Crawford, under my interpretation, will
exclude many of those statements, but it allows admission of
previously
cross-examined
statements
of
unavailable
witnesses. Thus, prosecutors may ameliorate the negative
impact of Crawford in these cases by creating opportunities for
victims to give cross-examined testimony close in time to the
assault when they are frequently still cooperating with
authorities.
My contribution to this Symposium is chiefly about
developing the further set of supporting doctrines that are
improved if it at least explicitly included the accusatory concept. I have written about
this basic argument in Mosteller, supra note 2, and I will not elaborate further here.
4
On the other hand, the impact on child sexual abuse cases is likely
minimal if the definition of testimonial is narrow, formal, formalistic, and limited to
close analogies to the types of statements specifically covered by Crawford – “prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial” and
“police interrogations,” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, also described as “structured police
questioning.” Id. at 53 n.4.
5
In Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation
of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511 (2005), I argued that important hearsay evidence
can continue to be received and criminals can be successfully prosecuted by providing
more confrontation and thereby satisfying Crawford’s requirements.
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necessary to ensure that actual confrontation occurs when
hearsay is admitted under the exceptions to Crawford, which I
suggest may be used to avoid much of its negative impact in
cases involving children and domestic violence. When the
confrontation right is satisfied by a child taking the stand at
the current trial, the right must be understood to require that
the prosecution call the witness and attempt to elicit his or her
accusation publicly. The Confrontation Clause requires not
only the right to cross-examine, but also, as the text itself
indicates, the right to be confronted with the witness’
accusation. Similarly, when the confrontation right is satisfied
in domestic violence cases by prior confronted testimony of an
unavailable witness, the right must be understood to require
that the prosecution call the witness to make his or her
accusation at that other proceeding. 6 Moreover, the proceeding
must have consequences to the government and/or benefits for
the defendant. The Clause is not satisfied by the prosecution
simply making the witness available at a prior hearing or
calling the witness to testify at a pretrial hearing that has no
consequences other than to render the testimony admissible if
the witness later becomes unavailable.
A contrary
interpretation would potentially transform the defendant’s
right to be confronted with witnesses at trial into the inferior
and inadequate right to have witnesses made available at some
point during the prosecution of the case.
In Parts II and III, I briefly set out that the
Confrontation Clause can be satisfied for prior statements of
children by the prosecution calling the child to testify at trial,
and for unavailable domestic violence victims by affording
early opportunities for testimony subject to cross-examination.
In Part IV, I develop two requirements that are interrelated in
Confrontation Clause theory. First, as to present testimony
(often by children), the prosecution must call the witness and
ask that witness to state her accusation in court. Second, as to
prior testimony by an unavailable witness (often in domestic
violence cases), the prosecution must elicit the testimony in a
proceeding where the defendant has not only the opportunity,
but also the motive, to cross-examine. In Part V, I discuss why
it is important to carefully scrutinize the prosecution’s claim
6
In the rare situation where the defendant voluntarily called the witness at
the earlier proceeding, the Clause is satisfied without more. In this situation, the
public accusation occurred and the defendant was obviously motivated by some
perceived benefit to call the witness.
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that a witness is truly unavailable once confronted testimony is
received.
Greater scrutiny is appropriate because the
prosecution’s incentive to find and call the claimed unavailable
witness is dramatically reduced once such testimony is secured.
II.

CONFRONTATION AT THE PRESENT TRIAL: ASSISTING
CHILDREN TO BE ABLE TO TAKE THE STAND

I begin with child victims and witnesses in sexual abuse
cases. In these cases, Crawford can be satisfied most easily by
the prosecution working diligently to prepare the child for
examination and producing a willing and able child for
testimony at trial. If the child takes the stand, testifies against
the defendant, and is subject to cross-examination, then there
is no Confrontation Clause objection to the admission of prior
hearsay statements by the child. End of issue. I call this way
of satisfying Crawford the Green-Owens principle of present
confrontation. 7
This mechanism gives the prosecution the incentive to
succeed in preparing the child to testify. This is a practical,
safe, and ethical solution because the prosecution is the party
that generally has access to the child and is best situated to
help prepare the child for testimony.
Moreover, the
prosecution is likely in the best position to actually produce the
child. This method of satisfying Crawford motivates the
prosecution to make the child available rather than trying to
admit hearsay after persuading the court that the child is
unavailable or incapable of testifying. 8
I do not suggest this “solution” is costless. It requires
hard work by prosecutors, police, social workers, parents, and
caregivers, and could cause the child to suffer emotional
trauma. However, I believe this solution works. In situations
where prosecutors have statutory incentives to call the child as

7
See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1988); California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1970). In Green, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Confrontation Clause is met as to any prior statement by that witness if the witness
takes the stand at the present trial, testifies, and is available for cross-examination.
399 U.S. at 157-64. In Owens, the Court made this method of meeting the
Confrontation Clause easy to meet by ruling that a witness with serious memory loss
was still “available” for cross-examination. 484 U.S. at 561-62.
8
States may want to change competency statutes and rules to permit
constitutionally able children to testify and be cross-examined.

2005] DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES

415

a witness, as they do for instance in Oregon, 9 prosecutors tend
to be successful in preparing the child for testimony.
In these situations, the defense may end up complaining
because cross-examination of children is difficult to conduct
effectively. The reality is that cross-examining children is
challenging in any situation and some defense attorneys may
not be up to the task. However, the Confrontation Clause is
still satisfied by an uninhibited opportunity to cross-examine,
even if this requires a lawyer to exercise substantial skill,
judgment, and sensitivity.
III.

PRIOR CONFRONTATION: HAVING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
VICTIMS TESTIFY AT EARLY ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS

In domestic violence cases, the ameliorative analogue to
the child victim testifying in sexual abuse cases is to provide
opportunities for early confrontation, which Crawford
recognizes as satisfying the Confrontation Clause for
unavailable witnesses. 10 I call this the past confrontation plus
present unavailability principle. 11
Often in these cases, the victim is cooperative with the
prosecution and more willing to testify immediately after the
violence, but that cooperation and willingness diminish over
time. Thus, if the victim’s testimony could be received soon
after the violent event, complete with an opportunity for crossexamination, the victim’s testimony would likely be more
forthcoming. Further, that testimony would be admissible
under Crawford if the witness later becomes unavailable.
This mechanism for meeting Crawford has an
additional benefit.
Frequently, perpetrators will, in one
fashion or another, coerce their victims either not to appear at
trial, or to be uncooperative or uncommunicative if they do
appear at trial. After confronted testimony has been given,
however, the defendant loses much of the incentive to coerce or
intimidate the victim into not appearing. Indeed, with the
9
Oregon Evidence Rule 803(18a)(b) provides that all prior statements of a
child in sexual abuse cases are admissible if the child testifies and is subject to crossexamination.
OR. R. EVID. 803(18a)(b) (2005) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. §
40.460(18a)(b) (2005)). This rule creates a hearsay exception for children in sexual
abuse cases that includes all statements admissible under the Green-Owens principle
of present confrontation.
10
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54, 57.
11
Professor Tom Lininger, who is part of the Symposium, has written about
this option. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers after Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747
(2005).
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confronted testimony “in the can” for use if the victim does not
appear and testify, the defendant may have the positive
incentive to have the victim appear and provide exculpatory
testimony. While that testimony may be false, presumably the
trier of fact will generally be able to separate truth from lies
given the obvious explanation for the change in story. Thus,
either prior confronted testimony will be admitted if the
witness is unavailable, or live testimony will take its place, and
the Green-Owens principle of present confrontation will allow
admission of the prior statement.
In either case, more
confrontation will lead to more admissible evidence.
IV.

THE INTER-RELATED REQUIREMENTS OF (1)
AFFIRMATIVE TESTIMONY AT THE PRESENT TRIAL IN
CHILDREN’S CASES AND (2) THE PROSECUTION ELICITING
TESTIMONY AT A PRIOR HEARING WHERE THE
DEFENDANT HAS BOTH OPPORTUNITY AND MOTIVE TO
CROSS-EXAMINE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES

Several courts, including State v. Snowden, 12 have
rejected the argument 13 that under the Green-Owens principle
simply having the declarant available to be called by the
defendant at trial satisfies the Confrontation Clause. These
courts have gotten the point right. However, sometimes they
stated the argument in the negative – the defendant has no
obligation to call a witness to make hearsay evidence
admissible and thereby prove the state’s case, 14 or that it is the
state’s burden to make the testimony admissible. 15 Snowden
goes further by making the important positive argument, “In a
criminal trial, the State is required to place the defendant’s
accusers on the stand so that the defendant both may hear the
accusations against him or her stated in open court and have
the opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses.” 16
In an earlier article, I detailed a more elaborate
argument for this absolutely correct point. 17 The proposition is
supported by the wording of the Confrontation Clause itself,

12

867 A.2d 314, 332-33 (Md. 2005).
See also State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 931, 938-39 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Bratton v.
State, 156 S.W.3d 689, 693-94 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
14
Cox, 876 So. 2d at 938.
15
Bratton, 156 S.W.3d at 694.
16
Snowden, 867 A.2d at 332 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988)).
17
See Mosteller, supra note 5, at 578-86.
13
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which requires that the defendant be “confronted with” the
witnesses against him, rather than merely having the right “to
confront.” 18 The proposition is stated in many of the Supreme
Court’s articulations of the right and also in culturally
important quotations about confrontation that the Court has
cited. All of these sources inform us that a defendant has a
right to face the accuser as that person is making his or her
accusation. 19 Further, the proposition is supported by the
historical writings available to the Framers, which contrasted
the despised inquisitorial methods with the obvious benefits of
the English common law method of proof, where witnesses
testify orally in open court before the defendant. Thus,
witnesses made their accusations there and then as opposed to
making them in private and having them recorded with the
clear potential for government manipulation and distortion. 20
It is critical to recognize that the right of confrontation
requires a public accusation. This point has direct application
to the way I interpret the Confrontation Clause and the way
Crawford should be satisfied in child abuse cases. As discussed
below, it also has important implications for how to define and
limit the right through prior testimony in an adversarial
setting. The Confrontation Clause may be satisfied as to a
prior statement by what occurs at the present trial, or if the
declarant is unavailable, by what occurred at a prior hearing.
Importantly, in both situations, the right to be “confronted
with” the witnesses against the defendant must be met. This
means that, first, the accuser must stand in the defendant’s
presence and be called upon to make his or her accusation, and
second, the defendant must have a chance to cross-examine.
Both components are required. 21
A common situation at apparent odds with the right I
have just described occurs when the accuser denies the
accusation, but the Confrontation Clause is still held to be
18

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016-19 (1988) (quoting numerous
statements from various sources that provide not only cross-examination but the right
to be faced with the accusation in the first instance); Dowdell v. United States, 221
U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (noting the similarity between the Sixth Amendment right and a
statute specifying that the accused is to be tried using only such “witnesses as meet
him face to face at trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give the accused
an opportunity of cross-examination”); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43
(1895) (including both “personal examination and cross-examination”).
20
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 373-74 (1783).
21
This is the unmistakable point of the quotations from Mattox, Dowdell, and
Coy discussed supra note 19 and accompanying text.
19
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satisfied by the witness’ present “accusation” and crossexamination. Does that denial fail the test of accusation, and if
it does not, how do I justify the result while maintaining my
general point that accusation is required?
I believe there is no requirement in the Confrontation
Clause that, when standing before the defendant and asked by
the prosecution to make the accusation, the accuser must in
fact incriminate the defendant. I will use the well-known
example – actually the counterfactual example – of Sir Walter
Raleigh to illustrate this point.
The basic facts of the Raleigh story are generally well
known in circles familiar with the Confrontation Clause
debate. The part of the story I am referring to, stated in brief,
involves Lord Cobham’s accusations to the Privy Council
implicating Raleigh in a plot to overthrow the crown. These
were received in “testimonial” form in Raleigh’s trial. Raleigh
repeatedly complained during that trial that Cobham should be
brought before him to make his accusations, believing, as
Cobham had previously communicated to Raleigh by letter,
that he would publicly recant those accusations. 22
My assumption is that had Cobham been produced by
those trying Raleigh, the sense of justice of his contemporaries,
the Framers, and modern observers would have been satisfied,
at least as a matter of confrontation. This would have
remained true even if Cobham had said in his testimony that
none of his prior statements were true, and Raleigh’s judges
had nevertheless relied on Cobham’s earlier statements to
convict. That certainly was the position of the Supreme Court
in California v. Green. 23
The Confrontation Clause requires the prosecution to
call the witness on direct, so that in most cases the accusation
will be presented directly to the defendant’s face. In those
cases where the witness repudiates her accusation, that denial
has a practical and a constitutionally significant impact: it is

22
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 157, 157 n.10 (1970); 30 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6342, at
258-69 (1997). It should be noted that Cobham had also written to the prosecutors that
his recantation was false and had been provided because Raleigh requested it. 1 DAVID
JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 444-46 (1832).
23
The Court in Green stated: “So far as appears, in claiming confrontation
rights no objection was made against receiving a witness’ out-of-court depositions or
statements, so long as the witness was present at trial to repeat his story and to
explain or repudiate any conflicting prior stories before the trier of fact.” 399 U.S. at
157 (emphasis added).
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made in open court and in the presence of the jury, without any
filter by the prosecution, and it tends to damage the
prosecution’s case. Thus, the defendant either is confronted
with the accusation, or, as Raleigh had hoped, the prosecution
suffers the harm of presenting a witness who exculpates the
defendant and thereby damages the government’s case.
Again, my general proposition is that the Confrontation
Clause requires that at one point in the trial the defendant
must have a face-to-face accusation (or repudiation of the
charges) by the witness in open court and the defendant must
have an opportunity to cross-examine that witness about the
accusations. I believe this understanding of the right has
implications as well for the situation where the witness is
unavailable and the confrontation right is satisfied by what
occurred at a prior proceeding. To be sufficient, what occurred
at that prior proceeding must itself meet this model of both
public accusation and cross-examination.
In general, for prior testimony to be admissible the
prosecution is first required to hold a hearing and call the
accusing witness to testify. The hearing should be satisfactory,
even if held very early in the case, provided that it offers some
potential benefit to the defendant, which motivates him to
cross-examine the witness and places the basic question of guilt
or innocence in some way at issue. This is true even though it
is not a mini-trial where guilt or innocence will be directly
decided. I believe a preliminary hearing or a motions hearing
will suffice where lesser consequences are involved as long as
the proceeding matters to both sides. For instance, current law
holds that preliminary hearings qualify even in jurisdictions
where the consequence of a dismissal of charges for lack of
probable cause is only the temporary freedom of incarcerated
defendants. 24 Thus, the prospect of eliminating conditions on
the terms of release or other restrictions on the defendant’s
movement, which are conditions that are generally applicable

24
See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 302 at 288 & n.5, § 304 at 297 & n.8
(John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). The United States Supreme Court approved use of
prior testimony from a preliminary hearing in both California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970), and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). No distinction is drawn in these cases
between examinations at preliminary hearings satisfying the hearsay rule under prior
testimony and the Confrontation Clause nor between jurisdictions where dismissal at
the preliminary hearing simply affects the immediate liberty of the defendant (e.g.,
federal prosecutions) and those where dismissal may have broader implications for
continued prosecution of the case (e.g., California).
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in domestic violence cases, should be a sufficient incentive for
the defendant.
Although developed principally in the context of a
hearsay rule rather than for Confrontation Clause purposes, I
believe that the requirements associated with the prior
testimony exception to the hearsay rule 25 capture the essence of
what should be sufficient, and frequently, what is required.
There must be a prior hearing at which the witness is either
called on direct examination by the prosecution or is
voluntarily called as a witness by the defendant.
The
defendant must have an opportunity to cross-examine, 26 and if
given a motive to do so, his failure to cross-examine for tactical
or strategic reasons will not render the testimony
constitutionally inadmissible. 27
In general, imperfections in the opportunity to crossexamine arising from factors such as a lack of full discovery at
an early stage in the proceeding should not be per se barriers to
admissibility; rather, the test should be the overall adequacy of
the opportunity. 28 Perfection should not be required because
the hearing is being held to satisfy a legitimate criminal justice
purpose.
Thus, when later events cause the witness’
unavailability, reliance on a second-best method of meeting
confrontation is justified.
Legislative changes may be necessary to create such
early adversarial hearings in domestic violence cases. For
example, many domestic violence cases involve only
misdemeanor charges, for which preliminary hearings are not
even authorized in most jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions,
the procedures at preliminary hearings may provide
inadequate opportunity for cross-examination on issues going
25
See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (requiring opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony).
26
If the defendant voluntarily calls the witness, conducting direct and
redirect and challenging the witness, and if the testimony is incriminating, the prior
testimony exception to the hearsay rule is satisfied. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
67-71 (1980) (ruling that the examination of the witness called by the defense attorney
constituted an adequate opportunity to confront the witness even though she was never
declared a hostile witness). Cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (treating the opportunity to
conduct direct and redirect as sufficient for admission of prior testimony).
27
See MCCORMICK, supra note 24, § 304 at 298 (observing that as to prior
testimony “judgments to limit or waive cross-examination at the earlier proceeding
based on tactics or strategy, even though these judgments were apparently appropriate
when made, do not undermine admissibility [if] the operative issue in the prior
proceeding [was] basically similar and if the opportunity to cross-examine was
available”).
28
See supra note 24.
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to guilt or innocence, and therefore may render testimony from
these hearings inadequate or problematic as an exception to
Crawford. For example, in People v. Frye, 29 the Colorado
Supreme Court held that restrictions on the scope of
examination in that state rendered preliminary hearings
inadequate to meet the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause. Further, the court declined to expand generally the
allowable scope of cross-examination to rectify the inadequacy
it perceived under the Confrontation Clause because doing so
would have altered the nature of preliminary hearings across
the system. 30 Whether or not Frye’s ruling is correct regarding
the adequacy of the state’s preliminary hearing under the
United States Constitution, its broader point is sound.
Changes may be necessary to ensure that early hearings
provide adequate opportunity for cross-examination, and these
changes will have other ramifications for trial proceedings.
Specifically, in order to conserve judicial resources, legislatures
may want to provide for preliminary hearings in misdemeanor
cases, but do so only in domestic violence prosecutions.
Further, they may want to grant broader rights of crossexamination or discovery to ensure that challenges to the
adequacy of the opportunity to cross-examine can be overcome.
States may also want to prohibit the waiving of a
probable cause hearing by the defendant, 31 which I believe the
states can do constitutionally. As I argued earlier, I do not
believe the rigorously enforced Confrontation Clause developed
in Crawford as applied to testimonial statements is satisfied by
simply giving the defendant an opportunity to call and examine
the witness. This is because the state, while offering the
opportunity, ventures nothing and offers no benefit. In this
situation, the defendant is not faced with an accuser, but
instead by either asking or not asking questions, he or she is
forced to validate admission of even the most damning
testimonial statements. This is not constitutionally adequate.
The situation where the defendant wants to avoid a
hearing in which the witness’ testimony will be presented and
cross-examination allowed, while exhibiting some superficial
similarity to the defendant’s failure to call an available
29

92 P.3d 970, 981 (Colo. 2004).
Id. at 978.
31
See State v. Whitehead, 950 P.2d 818 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling that
under existing statutory and state constitutional provisions the prosecution could not
prevent the defendant from waiving a preliminary hearing).
30
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witness, is quite different. If the prosecution is willing to call
the witness and risk losing something of consequence, the
defendant should not be able to avoid admission of prior
statements by refusing to participate. The prosecution should
be able to call a witness to present her or his accusations in
public and in the presence of the defendant and then stand
available for challenge through cross-examination. If the
objective defendant would have a motive to secure favorable
testimony from this witness, the confrontation right should be
satisfied. The defendant should not be able to avoid, by
waiving the hearing for tactical or strategic reasons, a real
opportunity to confront the accuser.
As stated above, I believe that the prior proceeding
must involve calling the witness for face-to-face accusation. In
cases where the testimony is a repudiation of the accusation,
the resulting damage is the prosecution’s. Importantly, this
means that simply affording the defendant a chance to examine
the witness in a deposition is not sufficient. It also means
other prior statements must be presented at the prior
adversarial hearing so that the defendant has the opportunity
to cross-examine the witness about them.
Merely making the witness available for a deposition to
be taken by the defendant should not satisfy the Confrontation
Clause. 32 This is little different than the situation Snowden
properly rejected, where the witness was available but was not
called as a witness by the state. 33 It is not the responsibility of
the defendant to make prior testimony admissible by securing
32
The intermediate courts of appeal in Florida are in conflict regarding
whether discovery depositions satisfy the right of confrontation. In Lopez v. State, the
First District held that the opportunity to conduct a discovery deposition did not satisfy
the confrontation right because of the inadmissibility of the deposition as substantive
evidence under state law, the absence of the defendant’s right to be present, and the
larger implications of a contrary holding to erase the confrontation right if the witness
was available for a discovery deposition at any time before trial. 888 So. 2d 693, 700-02
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). By contrast, the Fifth District reached a different conclusion
in Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling on rehearing
motion). In that case, the defendant had taken the witness’ deposition, and the court
treated it as sufficient to satisfy the confrontation right. Id. at 801.
33
In Snowden, the state argued that the defendant waived his confrontation
right because he did not call a declarant as a witness even though she was present in
the courthouse, although she was not in the courtroom until released by the judge
following the ruling on the admissibility of the hearsay statements. 867 A.2d 314, 33031 (Md. 2005). The court rejected the argument. Id. at 332-33. This situation is thus
functionally indistinguishable from the argument that if the defendant could have
called a witness for a deposition but does not do so, he or she waives the confrontation
right when the witness’ prior statement is presented at trial without that witness
taking the stand.
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cross-examination. Rather, it is the responsibility of the
government to ensure that the witness confronts the defendant
with his or her accusations; then it becomes the defendant’s
responsibility to cross-examine the accuser or face a ruling that
the defendant’s right has been satisfied by the opportunity,
even if he or she failed to take advantage of it.
Conversely, a deposition to preserve testimony may
qualify in some situations. In this scenario, the prosecution
calls the witness on direct examination, and the defendant is
allowed fully to cross-examine on all issues relevant to guilt or
innocence. The resulting testimony may be admitted by either
side if the witness becomes unavailable. 34 In addition to the
obvious potential benefits for the prosecution, this type of
deposition may have negative consequences and commensurate
benefits to the defendant if the witness’ testimony is
exculpatory. Finally, since it entails calling the witness to
make his or her accusation in public, it satisfies the
Confrontation Clause.
However, this type of deposition is of more limited
utility than an early preliminary hearing because such
depositions should not be authorized unless there is a concrete
justification for believing that the witness’ testimony must be
preserved at an early time. 35 Cross-examination opportunities
for the defendant should not be routinely diminished.
Accordingly, it is hard to justify a very early examination when
defense counsel is not adequately prepared or has not received
full discovery. Why should such a clearly inferior opportunity
to cross-examine be imposed on the defendant without a
triggering emergency? If it can be, I argue that the prosecution
must be required to conduct another deposition if the witness
remains available once discovery has been completed and the
defense counsel has prepared for trial. Thus, although this sort
of deposition is a potential vehicle for recording and admitting
prior testimony, it is not likely to be generally available. Even

34
Lopez suggests a different ruling for depositions designed to perpetuate
testimony admissible at trial. 888 So. 2d at 700 (citing State v. Basiliere, 353 So. 2d
820 (Fla. 1977)).
35
FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a) allows such a deposition after indictment, but only
in extraordinary circumstances and with some procedural protections.
These
requirements do not necessarily relate to any constitutional concern, but they do tend
to reduce the range of potential conflict with the Confrontation Clause.
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if constitutional, I suggest that broad use is contrary to sound
public policy. 36
As noted above, I believe another restriction must be
imposed on testimony received at these prior hearings. Other
prior statements of the witness must be offered in evidence at
that hearing to satisfy Crawford through the principle of prior
testimony and present unavailability. 37 I argue that a prior
statement, if it is testimonial under Crawford, must at some
point meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause –
either by what happened at the prior hearing coupled with
present unavailability or by what happens at the present trial.
As to statements that are not offered at the prior
hearing by the prosecution, there is no accusation and likely no
opportunity to cross-examine. As to statements that are
unknown at the time of the hearing, the failing is even clearer.
In both situations, I contend the right has not been satisfied.
Unlike the situation that exists when the witness is on the
stand at the current trial where potentially all prior statements
can be admitted, the mere fact that a witness has been crossexamined previously about an incident does not render
admissible all prior statements about that incident. For such
statements, an accusation has not been made and no
36
We have relatively little case law on the constitutionality of prior
testimony given in situations where the witness testifies on direct examination and the
defendant is allowed fully to cross-examine on issues relating to guilt or innocence, but
the defendant’s only motive to examine is that the testimony will be admissible if the
witness is unavailable at trial. See United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 791-93 (1st
Cir. 1979) (concluding that the Confrontation Clause was not violated where the trial
judge, predicting correctly that the witness would claim the Fifth Amendment at trial,
invited counsel for the co-defendants whom the witness had directly implicated to fully
cross-examine him). But cf. United States v. Taplin, 954 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (6th Cir.
1992) (ruling in somewhat similar context that FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) was not
satisfied).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 may come into more frequent use as a way to deal with
the separate concerns of foreign nationals who are incarcerated in the United States as
material witnesses and who have an interest separate from the defendant to be
deposed so that they may be released. The government has an interest in making
certain they are subject to cross-examination and that the hearing meets the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause so their testimony may be admitted at trial if
the witnesses are unavailable, as presumably many foreign nationals will be. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lai Fa Chen, 214 F.R.D. 578 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding exceptional
circumstances to justify granting the request for a material witness deposition). These
procedures certainly operate on the premise that a defendant may be put in a position
where he or she must cross-examine the witness brought to a deposition and examined
by the government or lose the opportunity to confrontation and have the testimony
admitted without cross-examination.
37
See, e.g., People v. Price, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 239 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding
satisfaction of the Confrontation Clause where defendant exercised opportunity to
cross-examine witness regarding prior statement).
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opportunity to cross-examine has been afforded. However,
since the test here is providing the defendant with a
meaningful opportunity for cross-examination, some minor
changes in the facts that the witness testified to at the prior
hearing, which may be contained in a hearsay statement by the
witness, should be permitted if the right to cross-examine has
been substantially afforded. 38
V.

THE TROUBLING INCENTIVE FOR THE PROSECUTION TO
ACCEPT THE WITNESS’ UNAVAILABILITY ONCE PRIOR
CONFRONTED TESTIMONY HAS BEEN SECURED

I worry that once prior confronted testimony of a
witness has been secured, pressure that would otherwise be felt
by the prosecution to secure the presence of that witness will
be substantially diminished, and the effect will be a decreased
effort to produce the witness for present testimony. In Ohio v.
Roberts, 39 Justice Marshall argued in dissent that the
government’s efforts to find the missing witness were
inadequate and contended that far more would have been done
had the state not satisfactorily obtained testimony from the
preliminary hearing. 40 One need not ascribe unethical motives
to the prosecution: it is human nature that most people work
harder when success is at stake and less hard when the
materials for success have already been acquired. Thus, if
prior confronted testimony is more frequently recorded in
domestic violence cases, it is safe to assume that the
prosecution will work somewhat less hard to secure the
presence of victims in those cases. I have suggested that the
defendant’s incentives may compensate in some situations to
bring victims to court, but that possibility should not relieve
the government of its obligation to demonstrate real

38
See People v. Ochoa, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 373 (Ct. App. 2004) (raising
issues regarding statement not offered at prior hearing), review granted, 101 P.3d 478
(Cal. 2004).
In Ochoa, the Court of Appeals found cross-examination at the
preliminary hearing adequate as to a prior statement that was not introduced at that
hearing where the prior statement was brought to the defendant’s attention before the
preliminary hearing and its contents appeared to overlap considerably with evidence
offered at that hearing. Without more detail than the opinion provides, it is difficult to
determine whether this case is rightly decided at least as a matter of harmless error. If
not, I question whether the failure of the defense to cross-examine on a statement not
offered by the prosecution should satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
39
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
40
Id. at 79-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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unavailability only after adequate efforts to locate and produce
the witness.
My point is that if we move in the direction of securing
more prior confronted testimony, courts will need to be vigilant
to ensure that the prosecution does indeed satisfy its
constitutional obligation to show that the witness is
unavailable. I am not suggesting a draconian standard.
Indeed, it is hard to articulate a specific standard to apply.
However, courts should view the government’s claim in the way
Justice Marshall suggested: Is the showing adequate in the
sense that the government worked roughly as hard to find and
produce the witness as it does in cases where the witness is
needed to prove the prosecution’s case? 41 Systemic reduction in
effort should not be tolerated.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Regardless of the breadth of the definition of
testimonial, Crawford will impact the ease with which
prosecutors secure convictions. Cases involving child sexual
abuse and domestic violence are particularly susceptible to
negative consequences because they often critically depend on
hearsay to prove the case.
Domestic violence cases in
particular rely on statements especially likely to be considered
testimonial because they are given to government agents in a
context that suggests to everyone involved that a criminal
prosecution is likely to ensue.
A broad negative impact on prosecution of these cases is
not, however, inevitable. More confrontation can be provided
while prosecutions successfully continue. This Comment is
largely about the important ancillary doctrines that need to be
developed to ensure that the confrontation that is provided in
fact satisfies the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. A
public accusation is not simply an after-thought of the right;
rather, both it and cross-examination are central components.
Whether confrontation occurs in the present proceeding or a
prior one, a public accusation is required at one point in the
case.
When the witness is unavailable at trial and
41

Justice Marshall put my test in slightly different form. He argued that the
prosecution would not have been so ineffectual and derelict in its efforts to secure the
presence of the witness if it had not had her favorable preliminary hearing testimony
to offer in her absence. See id. I suggest generalizing the test he would have applied in
Roberts.
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confrontation is satisfied by what occurred in the prior
proceeding, the government must likewise present the accuser
for the opportunity for cross-examination at that proceeding.
The government must put something at risk, and the hearing
must have consequences. To claim the defendant has been
confronted by providing an opportunity for cross-examination
which will likely only harm the defendant by allowing
otherwise inadmissible incriminating evidence to be admitted
at trial is inadequate to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
The range of issues left open by Crawford is enormous.
It will take sustained effort to develop a full set of doctrines
that both protect the defendant’s rights and facilitate justice. I
believe efforts like this excellent Symposium and, I hope, my
Comment are steps in that direction.

